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Social interactions about transgressions provide a context for the development of
children’s moral aversion to harming others. This study investigated mothers’ insistence
when communicating the prohibition against harming others to infants in everyday
home interactions. Mothers’ reactions to infants’ use of force against others (moral
harm transgressions) were compared to their reactions to transgressions pertaining to
infant wellbeing (prudential) and transgressions pertaining to inconvenience (pragmatic).
Twenty-six infants and their families participated in 2.5-h naturalistic home observations
when infants were 14, 19, and 24 months old. Mothers’ interventions on moral harm
transgressions involved increased use of physical interventions and direct commands,
and decreased use of distractions, softening interventions, and relenting/compromising,
compared to their interventions on prudential and pragmatic transgressions. Children
showed the greatest immediate compliance with, and least protests against, maternal
interventions on moral harm transgressions.
Keywords: moral development, mother–infant interactions, social domain theory, transgressions, naturalistic
interactions
INTRODUCTION
When infants hit, bite, or kick they elicit reactions that set the stage for their development of
a moral aversion to harming others. Rates of harmful behaviors increase in the first half of
the second year and decline over the subsequent years (Hay, 2005). By 3 years, children judge
harming others as morally wrong (Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Nucci and Weber, 1995; Dahl
and Kim, 2014). Most researchers agree that infants’ everyday experiences with transgressions
contribute to the development of moral and other norms, but have different hypotheses about
what those experiences are (Turiel, 1983; Grusec, 2011; Bloom, 2013; Smetana, 2013). This study
investigated a novel dimension of infants’ experiences with transgressions that may convey the
unique importance of the moral prohibition against harm: Variability in mothers’ behavioral
insistence on everyday rules.
“Insistence” here refers to mothers’ tendency to explicitly convey that the child is doing
something wrong. Being insistent means, for instance, physically holding the child back, saying
“no,” or refusing to relent or compromise. In contrast, distracting the child, comforting the child, or
compromising indicates a lack of insistence, in this definition. Insistence is a behavioral reflection
of how important it is for a caregiver to communicate a given prohibition to a child. Insofar as
children perceive caregivers to be more insistent on some prohibitions than others, children may
come to perceive some prohibitions as more important to parents than others. This perception may
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in turn affect children’s understanding of the nature of these
events and their tendency to accept or challenge parents’
prohibitions in future interactions.
Caregiver insistence on the moral prohibition against
harming others may be especially relevant in the second
year. The second year is characterized by both limited
linguistic abilities and an increase in parent–child conflicts,
including conflicts about infant use of force against others
(Rijt-Plooij and Plooij, 1993; Fenson et al., 1994; Biringen
et al., 1995; Hay, 2005). The co-occurrence of limited channels
of communication and high frequencies of transgressions
may lead caregivers to prioritize which prohibitions to insist
upon (or to “pick one’s battles,” as one participating mother
said).
This study investigated the hypothesis that mothers in U.S.
middle class families would, on average, be more insistent
on the prohibition against harming others than on other
types of prohibitions during the second year of life. The
study focused on mothers because infants commonly spend a
substantial amount of their time with their mothers, but this
does not imply that other social agents are unimportant for
social development. Mothers’ reactions to interpersonal harm
(e.g., hitting or biting, termed moral harm transgressions) were
compared to mothers’ reactions to prudential transgressions
(pertaining to the child’s welfare, e.g., climbing on a couch
or moving toward a staircase) and pragmatic transgressions
(pertaining to inconvenience, e.g., spilling or creating disorder)
(Tisak, 1993; Gray et al., 2012; Dahl and Campos, 2013; Dahl and
Kim, 2014).1
A second novel feature of the study was to investigate of
mothers’ reactions to prudential and pragmatic transgressions
during the second year of life. Although transgressions relating
to the child’s wellbeing (prudential) and the creation of mess
and other inconvenience (pragmatic) are common occurrences
during infancy, caregiver reactions to such transgressions in
infancy have previously only been investigated using maternal
report (Smetana et al., 2000; Dahl and Campos, 2013).
Several theorists have proposed those children’s construct
moral, prudential, and pragmatic concepts from everyday
social experiences (Turiel, 1983, 2015; Smetana, 2013). A key
corollary of this proposition is that children have different types
of experiences with moral harm, prudential, and pragmatic
transgressions. For instance, caregivers’ heightened insistence
on the prohibition against harming others could help children
view harming others both as wrong and as distinct from other
types of transgressions (Tisak, 1993; Nucci and Weber, 1995;
Smetana et al., 2012; Smetana, 2013; Dahl and Kim, 2014; Turiel,
2015). A first, high levels of insistence unequivocally conveys
to children that they are doing something considered wrong.
1The present study focused on moral harm events rather than all moral events,
which by most definitions also include issues of property rights and fairness (Turiel,
1983, 2015; Smetana, 2013). There were two reasons for this. First, past research
by Ross (1996) has indicated that parents do not insist on particular principles of
property (possession vs. ownership) during early family interactions, prioritizing
harmony over the enforcement of property rights. Second, pilot observations
suggested that interactions about other moral transgressions (e.g., violations of
fairness) were so rare that the present study would not have yielded enough data to
analyze responses to such transgressions.
Moreover, heightened insistence on moral harm prohibitions
relative to other prohibitions may help children recognize
how moral harm transgressions differ from other types of
transgressions (Dahl et al., 2011; Dahl and Campos, 2013; Dahl
and Tran, 2016). At least by 3-to 4 years of age, children
have come to see that the moral prohibition against harm
has a different justification than pragmatic, prudential, and
conventional norms, is not alterable by consensus, and should
be applied universally (Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Tisak, 1993;
Nucci and Weber, 1995; Smetana et al., 2012; Dahl and Kim,
2014).
Several theorists have argued for the importance of
considering the nature of children’s transgressions when
studying parental reactions and their influence on children
(Grusec and Goodnow, 1994; Holden and Miller, 1999; Turiel,
2005; Grusec and Davidov, 2010). However, much of the
research on how parents respond to infant transgressions focus
on reactions to a single transgression type, such as parental
attempts to keep infants from approaching a prohibited toy in
a research laboratory (e.g., LeCuyer-Maus and Houck, 2002;
Turiel, 2005; Kochanska et al., 2007). Without questioning
the importance of the prohibited toy paradigm, the present
research investigated a wider variety of transgression types
encountered by infants and their mothers in everyday home
interactions.
Insistence on the Prohibition against
Harming Others
There were three main reasons for hypothesizing heightened
maternal insistence on the prohibition against harming others in
the present study: (1) The prohibition against harming others is
seen as very important by caregivers (vs. pragmatic prohibitions).
(2) Harmful acts against others are particularly difficult to prevent
(vs. prudential and pragmatic transgressions). (3) Harming
others has no direct negative consequences for the transgressor
(vs. prudential transgressions). Although some or all of these
reasons may also lead mothers from other populations to show
heightened insistence on the prohibition against harming others,
the hypotheses and study rationale focus on the population under
investigation (Rogoff, 2003; see Discussion).
The Prohibition against Harming Others Is Important
The general prohibition against harming others is an
indispensable part of any social group. This moral norm
reflects a fundamental respect for the value of life (Dworkin,
1994). When individuals do harm others, the consequences
for transgressors, victims, and those around them are often
tragic (Dishion and Patterson, 2006). Indeed, mothers of infants
report that they see it as more important to request that their
children not harm others than to request that their children
not engage in pragmatic, and even prudential, transgressions
(Dahl et al., 2014). Mothers also show, and report, more anger
in response to moral harm transgressions than in response to
prudential and pragmatic transgressions (Dahl and Campos,
2013; Dahl et al., 2014). Some prohibitions against pragmatic
transgressions are not even communicated until into the third
year (Gralinski and Kopp, 1993; Smetana et al., 2000). Insofar
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as mothers consider it particularly important to prohibit
interpersonal harm in the second year, this provides one reason
for hypothesizing high insistence in response to infant moral
harm transgressions.
Harmful Acts against Others Are Difficult to Prevent
Prevention is one of the most effective ways of keeping children
from transgressing. By childproofing the home environment,
caregivers can prevent a large number of prudential and
pragmatic transgressions (although not all). Baby gates keep
children from going down staircases, and locked drawers and
cabinets keep children from playing with items that could
be dangerous or create a mess (Gärling and Gärling, 1995).
Moreover, many prudential and pragmatic transgressions can be
anticipated well in advance. If a child is moving toward the pet
food container, or an ungated staircase, caregivers will often be
able to intervene before the child completes the transgression.
In contrast, hitting, biting, and kicking are inherently hard to
prevent because these acts are always possible when a child
is near another person. Thus, the only way to keep moral
harm transgressions from happening in the future may be
to try to make the child understand that harming others is
not an acceptable behavior. This provides a second reason
for expecting heightened insistence on the prohibition against
harming others.
Harming Others Has No Direct Negative
Consequences for the Child
Even minor prudential transgressions are associated with pain or
discomfort for the child. Falling off a couch, running into a chair,
or touching a hot space heater lead to a direct negative experience
that would make the child wary of repeating the transgression.
In contrast, hitting others may cause pain to the victim, but not
immediately to the transgressor. Thus, a child will be especially
reliant on social signals for comprehending the wrongness of
harming others. This constitutes a third reason for mothers to
be particularly insistent when communicating the prohibition
against harming others.
Forms of Insistence
This study assessed several forms of insistence in mothers’
interventions on moral harm (harming others), prudential (child
well-being), and pragmatic (inconvenience) transgressions by
14- to 24-month-olds. These forms of insistence were chosen
on the basis of pilot observations, theoretical considerations,
and literature review. The subsequent paragraphs describe
the maternal behaviors reflecting insistence. A plus sign in
parentheses (+) indicates that the behavior represents high
insistence (e.g., physical intervention) and a minus sign (−)
indicates that the behavior represents low insistence (e.g.,
distraction).
Physical Interventions (+)
Physical interventions are highly common in early interactions
about transgressions (Zahn-Waxler and Chapman, 1982;
Kuczynski et al., 1987; LeCuyer-Maus and Houck, 2002). They are
also among the bluntest forms of insistence, leaving little room
for negotiation or non-compliance for the physically inferior
child. Hence, although physical interventions were expected
to be used in all types of interactions about transgressions,
they were expected to be especially common after moral harm
transgressions (Dahl and Campos, 2013).
Direct Commands (+)
The simplest form of verbal intervention is commands. While
comprehension of commands improves over the second year,
Kaler and Kopp (1990) found that infants early in the second
year comprehended 30–40 percent of requests for objects.
Thus, simple commands could serve as a valuable way of
communicating norms to young children.
Commands vary in the level of insistence they convey. Of
particular interest in the present study was a distinction between
direct commands and indirect commands (Kuczynski et al., 1987;
Crockenberg and Litman, 1990). Direct commands are defined
as explicit imperative statements, for instance, “No, don’t hit
your brother,” or, “Put the phone down.” Indirect commands
are questions or suggestions, for instance, “Do you want to
put the phone down?” or “Let’s not hit each other.” Direct
commands reflect greater insistence and were hypothesized to
be more common in moral harm situations than in prudential
and pragmatic situations. In contrast, indirect commands reflect
less insistence and were hypothesized to show the opposite
pattern.
Distraction (−)
Distraction is a common way of intervening on infant
transgressions (Reid et al., 1994; LeCuyer-Maus and Houck, 2002;
Dahl and Campos, 2013). Distractions serve the function of
drawing the child’s attention away from the prohibited activity,
for instance by attempting to engage the child in play with a
toy. Hence, distraction appears to prioritize harmony (preventing
the child from getting upset) over communicating to the child
that he or she is doing something wrong. For these reasons,
distractions were hypothesized to be more common in pragmatic
and prudential situations than in moral harm situations (Dahl
and Campos, 2013).
Softening Intervention (−)
All interactions about transgressions involve some “clash of
wills” and hence a chance for infants to get upset (Emde
et al., 1987). This forces caregivers to balance the goal of
communicating a prohibition with the goal of maintaining a
harmonious relationship with the child (Ross, 1996). One way
of promoting harmony is to attempt to soften the intervention
by acknowledging the child’s desire (e.g., “I know you want to
play with my cell phone”), comforting the child (“It’s going to be
okay”), or addressing the child with a term of endearment (“Oh,
honey”). It was expected that such softening behaviors would be
more common in prudential and pragmatic situations than in
moral harm situations. Mothers will likely be especially prone
to seek harmony if the child becomes upset. In pragmatic and
prudential situations, but not in moral harm situations, softening
responses were thus expected to become more common if the
child became visibly distressed.
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Compromising/Relenting (−)
On average, young children comply with about 60 percent of
parental interventions (Kuczynski et al., 1987). Ultimately, it is
nearly always possible for caregivers to ensure infant compliance
in the end, given caregivers’ superior physical strength. By lifting
infants away from the prohibited activity and placing them in
a separate space, caregivers can effectively keep infants from
transgressing. Hence, in the face of persistent non-compliance,
caregivers choose between insisting on compliance (at the risk
of making the infant highly distressed) and compromising or
relenting. For instance, compromising could mean allowing the
child to continue climbing on the couch, or continue playing
with a breakable object, while the parent is holding the child’s
hand. Compromising or relenting reflects low insistence and was
hypothesized to be less common in moral harm situations than in
prudential and pragmatic situations.
Child Responsiveness to Prohibitions
As noted, children do not seem to draw robust categorical
distinctions between moral and other violations until around
the third birthday (Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Nucci and
Weber, 1995; Dahl and Kim, 2014). Still, infants’ responsiveness
to prohibitions may yield some indications about whether
they perceive differences in caregiver prohibitions against
moral and other transgressions (Dahl and Tran, 2016). The
present study included two indicators of children’s sensitivity
to differences between moral harm, prudential, and pragmatic
events: compliance and protests. Young children show high rates
of non-compliance with and protests against caregiver requests
(Kuczynski et al., 1987). However, if children perceive caregivers
as more insistent on the prohibition against harm, they too
may begin to “pick their battles,” showing non-compliance and
protests in situations in which caregivers previously have shown
lower insistence. Thus, it was hypothesized that, in the present
study, children would be more likely to comply, and less likely
to protest, in moral harm situations than in prudential and
pragmatic situations.
The Present Study
The present study was a longitudinal home observation study
of mother–infant conflicts about moral harm, prudential, and
pragmatic transgressions during the second year of life. The study
differs from past research in several ways. Research investigating
mother-infant interactions has typically not distinguished
between types of transgressions corresponding to categories
of norms constructed by children (Dunn and Munn, 1985;
Power and Parke, 1986; Emde et al., 1987; Kuczynski et al.,
1987; Dunn, 1988; Kochanska, 2002; LeCuyer-Maus and Houck,
2002). In contrast, studies investigating how moral transgressions
elicit interactions different from other transgressions have
been typically involved older children, focused on verbal
content of interactions (which may be less salient or even
incomprehensible to infants), or contrasted only moral and
conventional transgressions (Smetana, 1984, 1989; Nucci and
Weber, 1995; Tisak et al., 1996; Killen and Smetana, 1999; Turiel,
2008).
The one study that has contrasted mothers’ responses to
moral harm, prudential, and pragmatic transgressions in the
second year relied on maternal recollections of past interactions
(Dahl and Campos, 2013). Aside from being limited by
the reliance on maternal report, the study by Dahl and
Campos (2013) did not investigate the forms of insistence
investigated in the present study. Finally, the study by Dahl
and Campos (2013) did not investigate child protests. By
using direct, videotaped observations of mother–infant conflicts
about these three types of transgressions, and by introducing
and studying the concept of caregiver insistence, the present
study increases our understanding of the everyday context in
which children gradually develop a moral aversion to harming
others.
The longitudinal design was chosen to increase the amount
of data obtained from each family and to take advantage of
the increased statistical power of within-subjects designs. Hence,
the target sample size (N = 26) and the frequency of visits
(three, one every 5 months) of this study were not chosen
with the aim of investigating individual differences or individual
patterns of change. While additional studies with larger sample
sizes and more data from each participant will be needed to
investigate individual differences (see Discussion), the goal of this
initial longitudinal study was to investigate overarching trends
in mother–infant interactions about moral harm, prudential, and
pragmatic transgressions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study was carried out in the accordance with the
recommendations of the University of California, Berkeley
Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects (UCB CPHS).
Parents of participating infants provided written consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The research was
approved by UCB CPHS (protocol number 2010-04-1348).
Participants
Twenty-six families participated in a 2.5-h home visit when
the target child (11 female, 15 male) was 14 months of age
(Mage = 14.5 months, SDage = 0.63 months). Most families
participated in a second visit when the child was 19 months
(N = 24, Mage = 19.5 months, SDage = 0.59 months) and again
when the child was 24 months (N = 22, Mage = 24.5 months,
SDage = 0.51 months). Two families were too busy to participate
in subsequent visits, one family moved to another state, and one
family stopped speaking English at home. All target children
had at least one older sibling less than 8 years of age. Families
were recruited from the participant database at the University of
California, Berkeley. The database contained contact information
of families living in a metropolitan area in the Western US who
had previously expressed interest in participating in research.
Sixty-three percent of parents were non-Hispanic Caucasian, 19
percent were Asian American, and 19 percent were of African–
American, Hispanic, other, or mixed ethnicity. Seventy-seven
percent of caregivers had a college degree and 29 percent had a
graduate degree.
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Materials and Procedure
At all visits, the target child, the mother, and one older sibling
less than 8 years of age were present. The requirement of having
one older sibling present was included to make the family context
more comparable for the different families. Visits were scheduled
to include a mealtime, also to keep the observation context more
comparable across visits.
Mothers were told to do whatever they would have been doing
if the observer had not been present, as the purpose of the
study was to investigate children’s everyday experiences. During
the visit, the observer videotaped the child’s behavior while
remaining at a distance and avoiding interactions with family
members. The observer logged every instance of the mother
intervening on the target child’s behavior, either by trying to
stop the target child from doing something or by negatively
evaluating the child’s action. The logging was done electronically
using an iPod Touch (Apple, Inc.). Three observers collected data
for the study. Observers were trained using pilot video recordings
until they logged 80 percent of the events logged by the main
observer. The purpose of the logging procedure was to combine
the advantages of event sampling (for the purposes of initial data
reduction) and coding of videotaped interactions (allowing for
detailed coding of naturalistic interactions).
At the first visit, mothers were given a demographics
questionnaire. At all three visits, mothers were also given
a behavior rating questionnaire. On the behavior rating
questionnaire, mothers indicated how important it was for them
to request that their child refrain from certain behaviors on
a scale from 1 (unimportant) to 4 (very important). The list
of behaviors was taken from Gralinski and Kopp (1993). Only
ratings pertaining moral harm (not being rough with other
children, not biting mom or dad), prudential (not climbing on
furniture, not going into the street, not touching things that are
dangerous), and pragmatic (not coloring on walls, not tearing
up books, not interrupting, not playing with food, not spilling
drinks) transgressions were included. Ratings for behaviors in
each category were averaged to create one moral, one prudential,
and one pragmatic score for each mother for each visit.
After the visit, the observer watched the logged situations
in the video recordings to identify situations in which there
was any doubt about why the mother intervened (for instance,
when the mother stopped the child from opening a cabinet but
the observer did not know what the cabinet contained). The
observer then conducted a phone interview with the mother
about these situations (typically 30–40 percent of situations), in
which the interviewer asked the mother what her concern was in
intervening upon the child’s behavior. Summaries of the mothers’
responses for each situation were used for classifying the child’s
transgression (see Coding and Data Analysis).
Coding and Data Analysis
The video recordings obtained during the home visits were coded
by research assistants blind to the study hypotheses. Coders only
coded situations that had been logged during the observation.
Video recordings from 20 percent of visits were coded by two
independent coders to assess inter-rater agreement.
Three sets of codes were applied to the interactions about
transgressions (situations in which the mother negatively
evaluated or attempted to stop the child’s behavior). One set of
codes applied to the level of the situation as a whole, a second
set of codes applied to the mother’s individual actions within the
situation, and a third set applied to the child’s individual actions
within the situation.
Situation Codes
Child transgressions were coded as either moral harm (causing
interpersonal harm, for instance hitting, biting, or kicking
someone else), prudential (doing something dangerous, for
instance climbing on furniture or putting toys in mouth),
pragmatic (causing inconvenience but no potential or actual
harm, for instance creating disorder, spilling food, or playing
with a breakable object), or other. Situations classified as “other,”
involving for instance conventional violations (2%) and property
conflicts (3%), were rare (total: 6% of situations) and were not
included in the analyses. If a mother had been interviewed
about the situation, the coder classified the situation based on
the mothers’ explanation. Situations involving both pragmatic
and moral or prudential concerns were classified as moral
or prudential respectively. Only 87 such mixed events were
recorded (4.7% of all events). Situations involving both moral and
prudential were rare and were excluded from analysis (N = 2).
Agreement for situation classification: κCohen = 0.90.
Coders also assessed how far the child had gotten in the
transgressive activity at the time of the first intervention (“degree
of completion:” started or completed, κCohen = 0.79). For instance,
if a child was reaching for a prohibited object on the table at
the time when the mother intervened, the degree of completion
would have been coded as started. In contrast, if the child had
already pushed the object off the table and onto the floor, the
degree of completion would have been coded as completed.
The purpose of this coding was to check the assumption that
intervention after completion of at least one transgressive act was
more common in moral harm situations than in prudential and
pragmatic situations.
Finally, coders assessed what the outcome of the situation was
(child complies, compromise, or mother relents, κCohen = 0.79).
Mother and Infant Codes
Codes for mothers’ and infants’ actions were derived from
previous studies of early family interactions (Kuczynski et al.,
1987; Smetana, 1989; Nucci and Weber, 1995; LeCuyer-Maus
and Houck, 2002; Dahl and Campos, 2013) as well as from
pilot observations. The codes were taken as indices of maternal
insistence (see Introduction), except for verbal explanations,
which were included to check the assumption that mothers’
viewed moral harm, prudential, and pragmatic transgressions
as qualitatively different. Since these codes were applied to
individual actions, multiple codes could be used for a single
interactant in a single situation (e.g., a mother could use
both physical intervention and verbal explanation in a single
situation).
For every maternal action within a transgressive situation
the coder noted presence of the following: physical intervention,
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TABLE 1 | List of maternal intervention codes.
Code Definition
Physical intervention Use of force to stop or prevent child from transgressing.
Direct command Explicit command telling the child to alter behavior, including second-person imperative verb form (“Don’t hit your brother,” “Put the scissors
down”).
Indirect command Suggestive or mild command telling the child to alter behavior, including first-person plural imperative (“Let’s not play with that”) or question
(“Do you want to give me the scissors?”).
Softening Acknowledgment of infant’s desire, attempt to comfort the child, proposal of compromise, term of endearment (e.g., “honey”).
Distraction Attempt to draw child’s attention to something other than the prohibited behavior.
Verbal explanation Verbal statement indicating why a given behavior was wrong.
Verbal explanations were further classified into one of the following categories:
Disorder Potential or actual disorder or property damage, including mess or spilling (e.g., “Look at this mess”).
Evaluation Evaluative statement about act (e.g., “That’s not very nice”)
Feelings/desires Potential or actual feelings or desires of another person (excluding pain or harm, e.g., “That’s annoying me”).
Harm to child Potential or actual harm to the child (e.g., “You’ll hurt yourself”).
Harm to others Potential or actual harm to another person (e.g., “That’ll hurt your sister”).
Property ownership Ownership of object (e.g., “That’s mommy’s cup”).
Rule Wrongness of act described on a general level (“We don’t run in the stairs”).
Sanction Potential or actual sanction against the child (“One more and you’ll get a time-out”).
Other reason Any reason not fitting into the above categories (“We’re going to go to Grandpa’s house now”).
verbal command (either direct command or indirect command),
distraction, softening, and verbal explanation (see Table 1 for
definitions). Explanations were further classified using the
following coding categories derived from pilot observation and
past research: Disorder, evaluation, feelings/desires of others, harm
to child, harm to others, property ownership, rule, sanction,
and other (Nucci and Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1989; Nucci and
Weber, 1995; Dahl and Campos, 2013). Mean agreement for
maternal interventions: κCohen = 0.76 (range: 0.68–0.91). The
infants’ behavior was coded for the following: compliance with the
initial maternal intervention (i.e., stopped the behavior after first
intervention), protest during the situation (e.g., by saying “no”
or “a little longer”), or vocal or facial signs of negative emotion
during the situation. Mean agreement for child codes: κ = 0.82
(range: 0.65–0.98).
Seriousness of Physical Harm
To investigate whether heightened insistence on moral harm
prohibitions compared to prudential prohibitions could be
explained by the seriousness of physical harm, coders assessed
the seriousness of potential or actual harm associated with
each prudential and moral transgression. Codes were applied
based on the harm that could have occurred if the child
continued transgressing rather than the harm that actually
occurred, since children were often stopped from completing
the transgression (e.g., stopped before being hit by a car).
Each of the types of harm was later assigned a numerical
value representing the relative seriousness of the immediate
consequences. Immediate (rather than long-term) consequences
were emphasized because it was expected that mothers would
be more insistent if consequences were immediate (e.g., falling
down from a high-chair) than when consequences required
prolonged exposure to the hazard (choking or, even more long-
term, sunburn).
Based on review of the types of transgressions encountered
in the visits, the following codes were used: (The numerical
seriousness values are listed in parentheses.) Hit by car (5),
falling down from elevated location (e.g., kitchen counter) (4),
choking/suffocation (3), burn or cut injuries (3), being hit, bitten,
kicked, or stepped on (2), falling down on flat surface (2), detectable
harm only with repeated exposure (e.g., sunshine, 1). In principle,
both moral and prudential transgressions could be coded at any
level of severity (1–5). Agreement for numerical ratings: Pearson’s
r = 0.87.
Data Analytic Strategy
Data were analyzed using Generalized Linear Mixed Models
(GLMMs) with Poisson, Gaussian, or binomial error
distributions and logarithmic, identity, or logistic link functions
respectively (Hox, 2010). Models were fitted in R version 3.2.4
using the lme4 package. Initial analyses revealed no significant
effects of child gender, which was therefore not included as a
predictor in the final models. Random effects of visit and family
id were used to account for the nested structure of the data. The
specific models used for each dependent variable are described in
Section “Results.”
For each form of insistence, the percentage of mothers
showing the predicted pattern (greater average insistence in
moral harm situations) is reported, controlling for visit number,
to indicate whether most families showed the overall pattern of
situational differences.
RESULTS
A total of 1861 situations involving moral harm, prudential, or
pragmatic transgressions were coded in the 72 visits, yielding
an average frequency of 10.3 situations per hour. Among these
situations, 120 (6.4%) were coded as moral harm, 699 (37.6%)
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as prudential, and 1042 (56.0%) as pragmatic. The targets of
children’s moral transgressions were parents (40%), siblings
(43%), and pets (17%). Twenty-one infants had at least one
moral situation (19/22 of families with three visits) and all 26
infants had at least one prudential situation and one pragmatic
situation.
Mothers’ Verbal Explanations
Mothers’ provided explanations in 41% of situations. There
was no significant effect of situation type on whether mothers
provided at least one explanation in a given situation,
D(2) = 1.39, p = 0.50. The use of explanations had a near-
significant, positive relation to infant age, D(1)= 3.82, p= 0.051.
However, the main hypotheses about explanations pertained to
the association between the content of explanations and the
nature of the child’s transgression.
Mothers’ verbal explanations in response to transgressions
supported the hypothesis that mothers draw qualitative
distinctions between moral harm, prudential, and pragmatic
violations (Smetana et al., 2000; Dahl and Campos, 2013). The
type of justification provided by mothers dependent significantly
on situation type, binomial GLMM: D(12) = 460.80, p < 0.001.
(Only data from situations in which the mother provided at least
one justification were included and models included child age
as predictor.) Consistent with past work, references to harm to
others were most common in moral situations (63% of moral
situations), references to harm to the child were most common
in prudential situations (44%) and references to disorder or
property destruction were most common in pragmatic situations
(25%). Reasons classified as “other” were more common in
pragmatic situations (45%) than in moral situations (20%) with
prudential falling in between. This category included justification
statements not falling into any of the other justification
categories, such as “Don’t get your toys out now because we’re
going to Grandpa’s house.” Anecdotally, it appeared that many
of the explanations classified as “other” expressed mothers’
pragmatic considerations (i.e., about inconvenience of child’s
behavior for ongoing or planned activities). Table 2 shows how
the justification categories varied as a function of situation type.
Degree of Completion
Whether the child had completed at least one transgressive act
before the first maternal intervention (a dichotomous variable)
was analyzed using binomial GLMMs with random intercepts for
visit and family and fixed effects of situation type and child age.
Hypotheses for main effects of situation and age were tested using
likelihood ratio tests (for difference in model deviance between
full model and model with the relevant coefficients constrained
to 0) and Wald tests were used to compare each situation type
(Hox, 2010).
As expected, there was a significant effect of situation type
on degree of completion before first maternal intervention,
D(2) = 41.90, p < 0.001. Interventions after completion of at
least one transgressive act were more common in moral situations
(33%) than in prudential (7%) and pragmatic (10%) situations,
Wald tests: ps < 0.001. Intervention after completion was also
TABLE 2 | Content of explanation as a function of situation type.
Situation type
Moral harm Prudential Pragmatic
Disorder 0.00a 0.04a 0.25b∗∗∗
Evaluation 0.13 0.21 0.16
Feelings/desires 0.00 0.05 0.07
Harm to child 0.00a 0.44b 0.01a∗∗∗
Harm to others 0.63a 0.00b 0.01b∗∗∗
Property ownership 0.02 0.01 0.05
Rule 0.11 0.17 0.11
Sanction 0.09 0.06 0.05
Other reason 0.20a 0.29a,b 0.45b∗∗∗
The table shows number of situations in which the mother used a particular
explanation type divided by the number of situations in which a mother used
any explanation, calculated separately for each domain. P-values are adjusted
for multiple tests using Holm’s (1979) procedure. Cells with different subscripts
differ significantly (adjusted p < 0.05). ∗∗∗ Situation effect is significant (adjusted
p < .001).
more common when infants were older, D(1) = 6.00, p = 0.01
(Visit 1: 8%, Visit 2: 10%, Visit 3: 14%).
Ratings of Importance of Requests
Importance ratings were analyzed using Gaussian GLMMs with
random intercepts for visit and family and fixed effects of
situation type and child age. Hypotheses for main effects of
situation and age were tested using likelihood ratio tests and Wald
tests were used to compare each situation type.
Mothers said it was more important to request that their
infants not engage in moral harm transgressions (M = 3.76,
SD = 0.38) than to request that their infants not engage in
prudential (M = 3.59, SD = 0.34) or pragmatic transgressions
(M = 2.82, SD = 0.53), Gaussian GLMM: D(2) = 140.95,
p < 0.001. Wald tests revealed that ratings of all three
situation types differed significantly from each other, ps < 0.01.
Overall, mothers’ importance ratings increased with child age,
D(1)= 14.01, p < 0.001 (Visit 1: 3.27, Visit 2: 3.36, Visit 3: 3.53).
Maternal Insistence
Table 3 shows a summary of the findings on the five forms of
insistence.
The high prevalence of physical interventions made it possible
to analyze these data at the level of individual interventions
rather than at the level of situations. Whether a mother used
a physical intervention was predicted using binomial GLMMs
with random intercepts for visit and family and fixed effects of
situation type, intervention number (within each situation), and
child age. Hypotheses for main effects of situation and age were
tested using likelihood ratio tests and Wald tests were used to
compare each situation type. As the number of maternal actions
varied between situations (range: 1–27), only the five first actions
were included in the analyses, which included 75 percent of
interventions.
As predicted, there was a significant effect of situation type on
the use of physical interventions, binomial GLMM: D(2)= 20.07,
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TABLE 3 | Overview of findings on forms of insistence.
Situation Type Situation
effect
Moral Prudential Pragmatic
Physical interventions 0.31 0.31 0.21 –
Prop. of interventions 0.18a 0.15b 0.11c ∗∗∗
Direct commands 0.78 0.75 0.70 –
Prop. of commands 0.90a 0.76b 0.73c ∗∗∗
Distraction 0.04a 0.11b 11b ∗
Softening
Child distress 0.08a 0.41b 0.51b ∗∗
No distress 0.14a 0.27b 0.22a,b ∗
Compromise/relenting 0.03a 0.07b 0.10b ∗∗∗
The table shows an overview of the findings for the five forms of insistence. The
columns for situation type indicate the proportion of situations that included a
given type of maternal intervention. Since data for physical interventions and direct
commands were analyzed by individual interventions and commands respectively
(rather than by situations, see Results), the proportions corresponding to the
analyses reported in the text are provided in italics. Cells with different subscripts
differ significantly at p < 0.05 (Wald tests for regression coefficients). The rightmost
columns indicate significance levels for overall effects of situation obtained from
likelihood ratio tests. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
p < 0.001. Wald tests revealed that the use of physical
interventions was significantly more common in moral harm
situations (18% of interventions were physical) than in prudential
(15%) and pragmatic situations (11%), ps < 0.05. Physical
interventions were also significantly more common in prudential
than in pragmatic situations. At the level of individuals, 43%
of mothers were more likely to use physical interventions in
moral situations than in prudential and pragmatic situations.
The presence of physical interventions was also more common
later in the situation (i.e., positively related to intervention
number), D(1)= 34.78, p < 0.001, and negatively associated with
child age, D(1)= 8.11, p= 0.004.
The main question regarding commands was whether the
type of command (direct vs. indirect) depended on situation
type. To test this hypothesis, binomial GLMMs were fitted to
predict whether the command used was a direct or an indirect
command (only interventions involving maternal commands
were included). The models also included random intercepts for
visit and family and fixed effects of situation type, intervention
number, and child age. Hypotheses for main effects of situation
and age were tested using likelihood ratio tests and Wald tests
were used to compare each situation type. As in the analyses of
physical interventions, only the first five interventions from each
situation were included in the analyses.
There was a significant effect of situation type, D(2) = 39.18,
p < 0.001, in predicting the type of command used. Direct
(as opposed to indirect commands) were significantly more
common in moral harm situations (90.2% of commands) than in
prudential (75.8%) and pragmatic (72.7%) situations, Wald tests:
ps < 0.001. Direct commands were in turn more common in
prudential than in pragmatic situations, χ2(1) = 5.8, p = 0.016.
Seventy-six percent of mothers were more likely to use direct
commands in moral situations than in prudential and pragmatic
situations, while 90% of mothers were more likely to use indirect
commands in prudential and pragmatic situations than in moral
situations (after correcting for intervention number and visit
number). Direct commands were also more common earlier
in the interaction, D(1) = 12.97, p < 0.001, but were not
significantly associated with child age, D(1)= 0.46, p= 0.30.
Due to the lower frequency of the remaining forms of
insistence (distraction, softening, and relenting/compromising,
occurring in less than 10% of situations for at least one situation
type), it was not possible to fit models for these variables
that included intervention number. The models analyzing these
insistence forms therefore analyzed whether these interactions
were present or absent from a situation using binomial GLMMs
with random intercepts for visit and family and fixed effects of
situation type and child age.
Attempts to distract the child were significantly less common
in moral harm situations than in prudential and pragmatic
situations, binomial GLMM: D(2) = 6.17, p = 0.046. Wald
tests showed that moral situations (4.2%) differed significantly
from prudential (10.9%) and pragmatic situations (11.0%),
ps < 0.05, whereas the two latter did not differ from each other,
χ2(1)= 0.26, p= 0.61. At the level of individuals, 90% (19/21) of
mothers used distraction more often in prudential and pragmatic
situations than in moral situations. The use of distractions was
also negatively related to child age, D(1) = 4.91, p = 0.027 (Visit
1: 16.7%, Visit 2: 7.9%, Visit 3: 6.7%).
Also in line with hypotheses, there was a significant interaction
between situation type and infant negative emotion for softening
interventions, D(2) = 6.22, p = 0.045. In prudential and
pragmatic situations, softening was significantly more common
if the child showed negative emotion (Prudential: D[1] = 5.13,
p = 0.024, Pragmatic: D[1] = 39.41, p < 0.001). In contrast,
there was no relation between infant negative emotion and
maternal softening in moral harm situations, D(1) = 0.56,
p = 0.45. The effect of situation type was significant for
situations with negative emotion, D(2) = 10.49, p = 0.005,
and without negative emotion, D(2) = 7.19, p = 0.027. In
both cases, moral harm situations elicited the least softening
interventions. Ninety percent of mothers used softening more
often in prudential or pragmatic situations than in moral
situations.
Finally, mothers’ tendency to compromise or relent was
also significantly related to situation type, binomial GLMM:
D(2) = 13.82, p < 0.001. Compromising or relenting was
less common in moral harm situations (2.5%) and prudential
situations (7.0%) than in pragmatic situations (10.3%), Wald
tests: ps < 0.02, whereas moral harm and prudential situations
did not differ significantly, χ2(1) = 2.40, p = 0.12. Ninety
percent of mothers were more likely to relent or compromise in
prudential or pragmatic situations than in moral harm situations.
There was no significant effect of child age, D(1)= 0.27, p= 0.60.
Child Reactions to Interventions
Child Protests
Whether a child protested in a given situation was analyzed using
binomial GLMMs with random intercepts for visit and family
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and fixed effects of situation type and child age. Hypotheses for
main effects of situation and age were tested using likelihood
ratio tests and Wald tests were used to compare each situation
type.
There was a significant effect of situation on the presence of
child verbal protest, binomial GLMM: D(2) = 6.72, p = 0.035.
Infants protested significantly more in pragmatic situations (7.2%
of situations) than in moral harm situations (3.3%), Wald test:
χ2(1) = 4.5, p = 0.034. The probability of protest in prudential
situations (5.2%) did not differ significantly from that in moral
situations, χ2(1) = 2.2, p = 0.13, or pragmatic situations,
χ2(1) = 2.0, p = 0.16. There was also an effect of child age,
D(1)= 9.16, p= 0.002 (Visit 1: 1.0%, Visit 2: 6.2%, Visit 3: 12.1%).
The interaction between child age and situation type was not
significant, D(2)= 0.04, p= 0.98.
Immediate Child Compliance
Whether a child initially complied in a situation was
analyzed using binomial GLMMs with random intercepts
for visit and family and fixed effects of situation type and
child age. Hypotheses for main effects of situation and
age were tested using likelihood ratio tests and Wald tests
were used to compare each situation type. These analyses
included all situations, including those in which children
had already transgressed once, because it was nearly always
possible for children to transgress a second time (e.g., by
hitting again) and thus failing to comply with the maternal
prohibition.
There was a significant effect of situation type on immediate
compliance, binomial GLMM: D(2)= 8.54, p= 0.010. Immediate
compliance was higher in moral harm situations (59%) than in
prudential (42%) and pragmatic (46%) situations, Wald tests:
ps < 0.05. Prudential and pragmatic situations did not differ
significantly, Wald test: χ2(1) = 2.8, p = 0.10. There was
no significant effect of child age on immediate compliance,
D(1) = 1.00, p = 0.32. The differences in compliance were
not simply due to differences in maternal use of physical
interventions, as immediate compliance was highest in moral
situations also when only analyzing data from situations with no
physical interventions, D(2)= 8.54, p= 0.014.
Seriousness of Harm
One possible explanation for findings of greater insistence
in moral situations is that moral situations involved more
serious potential or actual harm than prudential situations. (By
definition, pragmatic situations did not involve harm.) To test
this possibility, a linear mixed model was fitted to the data
from prudential and moral harm situations with Gaussian error
distribution and identity link function predicting severity rating
as a function of child age and situation type. There was a
significant effect of situation type, D(1) = 508.03, p < 0.001, as
prudential situations involved significantly greater potential or
actual harm (M = 2.94) than moral harm situations (M = 2.05).
There was also a significant effect of child age, D(1) = 4.45,
p = 0.034, reflecting a positive relation between child age and
potential or actual harm. On an individual level, 95% of families
had higher mean severity of prudential than of moral situations,
binomial test: p < 0.001. In short, any heightened insistence in
moral situations compared to prudential situations could not be
explained by greater overall severity of harm in moral situations.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated mothers’ insistence when
intervening on infants’ moral, prudential and pragmatic
transgressions. The main hypothesis was that mothers
would show greater insistence on moral prohibitions (against
harming others) than on prudential prohibitions (against doing
something that could affect the child’s welfare) and pragmatic
prohibitions (against creating inconvenience). The rationale
for this hypothesis was supported by several findings. First,
mothers reported that moral requests were more important than
prudential and pragmatic requests. Second, mothers were more
likely to intervene prior to completion of a transgressive act in the
prudential and pragmatic situations than in the moral situations.
As noted in the Introduction, since moral transgressions are less
preventable, the primary way to stop moral transgressions from
happening may be to convey to the child that the behavior is not
acceptable.
As hypothesized, mothers showed greater insistence in
moral harm situations than in prudential and pragmatic
situations across several forms of insistence. In response to
moral transgressions, mothers showed greater use of physical
interventions (e.g., holding the child back), greater use of direct
commands (“No, don’t hit your brother”), decreased use of
distraction (e.g., drawing child’s attention to something else),
and decreased use of softening interventions (e.g., acknowledging
child’s desire to transgress). In prudential and pragmatic
situations, but not in moral harm situations, mothers were more
likely to use softening interventions if the child became upset.
Finally, mothers were four times more likely to compromise or
relent in pragmatic situations than in moral harm situations, with
prudential situations falling between the two.
The greater insistence in moral situations compared to
prudential situations was not attributable to greater severity
of harm in moral situations. On the contrary, the actual or
potential harm was, on average, more severe in prudential
situations than in moral situations. This finding is particularly
striking since Western caregivers prevent many severe prudential
transgressions from happening through babyproofing their
homes (Gärling and Gärling, 1995).
Mothers’ overall heightened average insistence on the
prohibition against harming others likely contributes to children’s
growing ability to distinguish moral, prudential, and pragmatic
transgressions (Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Tisak, 1993; Smetana
et al., 2012, 2014; Dahl and Kim, 2014). Heightened insistence
in moral situations may communicate to infants that mothers
viewed harming others as a particularly serious transgressions.
Heightened insistence may also draw infants’ attentions to the
categorically distinct features of moral harm transgressions. That
is, insofar as more insistent reactions are more likely to call
infants’ attention to their violation, mothers’ insistence may help
children realize that the use of force against others causes pain or
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discomfort. Finally, some forms of insistence may lead children
to view prohibitions as varying in how negotiable they are.
For instance, if children experience that parents are comforting
them when they cannot continue with a pragmatic transgression
(softening) or are allowing children to continue transgressing
after an initial prohibition (relenting), this may lead children
to view pragmatic rules as subject to negotiation and alterable,
unlike moral rules (Nucci and Weber, 1995; Dahl and Kim, 2014).
(I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.)
The data on child compliance and protests were consistent
with the claim that young children are sensitive to the differences
between moral harm, prudential, and pragmatic prohibitions.
Infants showed greater immediate compliance with, and lower
tendency to protest against, mothers’ prohibitions against
harming others, compared to their reactions in prudential and
pragmatic situations. While limit-testing is common during the
early years (Dunn and Munn, 1985; Kuczynski et al., 1987),
children’s perceptions of transgressions and expectations about
caregiver behavior may guide children’s decisions about when to
protest and comply (Dahl and Tran, 2016).
Mother’s heightened insistence on prohibitions against moral
harm transgressions may also have contributed to why infants
engaged in more prudential and pragmatic transgressions than
moral harm transgressions. However, it is difficult to compare
these frequencies directly since the number of opportunities to
engage in these transgressions may also differ. In a typical home,
there are far more objects, with which infants could create a
mess, than there are people and pets, which infants could harm.
Moreover, people afford many acts aside from harming (a parent
can be hugged, played with, or watched), whereas many objects
may afford few non-transgressive behaviors to infants (food can
be eaten, spilled, or taken away) (Gibson, 1979).
Maternal insistence is only one of several features of
social experience that may help children develop distinct
concepts about harm transgressions. Consistent with past
research, mothers in the present study provided different verbal
explanations to different transgressions, for instance referring
to others’ wellbeing following moral harm transgressions (e.g.,
Smetana, 1984, 1989; Nucci and Weber, 1995). Moreover, moral
harm transgressions often involve expressions of distress from
a victim and children may be involved in such events not only
as transgressors but also as victims of others’ transgressions
(Turiel, 1983; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). Situational features may
vary in how informative they are to children at various ages.
For instance, infants may not fully understand the differences
between verbal explanations uttered in response to moral,
prudential, and pragmatic transgressions (Fenson et al., 1994;
Dahl and Campos, 2013). Ultimately, it seems likely that children
must draw on multiple sources of converging information (e.g.,
caregiver insistence, verbal explanations, own experiences of
pain, observations of others’ distress) in order to construct
categorically distinct moral, prudential, and pragmatic concepts.
Two types of additional research would be particularly
important to advance our knowledge about how children
construct moral, prudential, and pragmatic concepts during the
second and third years of life. First, larger naturalistic studies
are needed do document different developmental trajectories
and predict individual differences. While the present study
focused on overarching differences in children’s experiences
following different transgressions, and lacked the sample size
and the number of data points to meaningfully investigate
individual differences and trajectories, the theoretical framework
that motivated this research yields testable predictions about
individual differences (Smetana et al., 2014). For instance,
with a larger number of families and more frequent visits, it
would be possible to investigate whether children whose parents
respond more differentially to moral and other transgressions
show earlier signs of differentiating between moral and other
prohibitions, as indicated by differential levels of transgressions,
compliance, or protest rates. Indeed, past research has found
stable individual differences in rates of aggressive behaviors
starting in the toddler years (Cummings et al., 1989; Keenan
and Shaw, 1994). There may also be individual differences in
the ability to distinguish between moral and other types of
transgressions. Most children eventually draw such distinctions,
but the development of domain distinctions may follow different
trajectories (Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Jagers et al., 1996;
Smetana et al., 2012). By following children into the third and
fourth years, it would be possible to predict individual differences
in the development of children’s ability to verbalize distinctions
between moral and other norms, as shown by Smetana et al.
(2012).
Secondly, additional experimental research can elucidate how
young children construct moral, prudential, and pragmatic
conceptions from everyday experiences. [For discussions of the
complementary roles of naturalistic and experimental research,
see Bandura and Walters (1963); Willems (1967), Gibson (1979).]
By manipulating the situational features of situations, e.g., the
mothers’ reaction to an event, it is possible to test how children
make use of such information (Dahl and Tran, 2016). For
instance, one experiment manipulated whether preschoolers
saw a novel action either cause pain to a puppet and elicit a
prohibition from an adult or cause a box to make a sound
and elicit a prohibition from an adult (Srinivasan et al., 2015).
Children who saw the act cause pain and elicit a prohibition
viewed the act as a moral transgression, whereas children who
saw the act make a sound and elicit a prohibition viewed
the act as a conventional transgression (or no transgression at
all).
Past research has demonstrated cultural and contextual
variability in when and how parents from different communities
communicate prohibitions to their families (Dunn and Brown,
1991; Harkness and Super, 2002; Rogoff, 2003). Briggs (1974)
noted that the Inuit families she observed rarely explicitly
corrected misbehaviors when children were very young. [For
similar reports from other communities of adults “indulging”
young children, see Hewlett (1992) and Chapin (2010).] Within
a given community, the presence of siblings may affect the
rate of conflicts, especially moral ones (Tremblay et al., 1999).
It is also possible that observations in other settings, such
as playgrounds, would change the distribution of events, for
instance by increasing the number of moral transgressions or by
allowing for other types of transgressions within each category
(e.g., picking up trash from the ground or hitting unfamiliar
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peers). While a single study cannot study all the relevant
natural contexts in which children engage in transgressions, a
concerted effort involving multiple studies and investigators will
ultimately provide a more complete picture of the variabilities
(and similarities) in the many everyday contexts of early socio-
moral development than we currently have.
Despite such contextual variability, some basic features
likely characterize most caregiver-child relationships. First, as
mentioned, most infants occasionally use force against others
(Dunn and Munn, 1985; Tremblay et al., 1999; Dahl and Campos,
2013). Second, the three reasons for expecting heightened average
insistence on the prohibition against harming others apply,
albeit to varying degrees, across contexts: (1) The prohibition
against harming others is central to most parents of young
children (unlike pragmatic transgressions), (2) infants’ moral
transgressions are harder to prevent than prudential and
pragmatic transgressions, and (3) moral transgressions lack direct
negative consequences for the transgressor (unlike prudential
transgressions) (LeVine, 1988; Turiel, 2005).
This naturalistic study suggests that mothers generally
show greater insistence on the moral prohibition against
harming others than on prudential and pragmatic prohibitions.
Additional research is needed to investigate individual and
cultural variability in caregivers’ differentiated responses to
transgressions, as well as how children make use of caregivers’
responses to construct the distinct conceptions of moral,
prudential, and pragmatic norms evident in most children by
preschool-age (Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Tisak, 1993; Nucci
and Weber, 1995; Dahl and Kim, 2014).
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